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Rough Places Plain

T

he 'now i' beginning to mean bu,ine" no"' and though mo" of the wodd we wmk in
seems determined to ignore it and go on as usual, it's a great time to think about reading. Snow and
ice mean that outdoors you can fall and hurt yourself, whereas a good book and an afghan will
prevent any such outcome to an afternoon's activity indoors. The pleasures of the book remain,
thankfully, endless. And since one of the pleasures of reading has ever been to tell others, this page
then to describe a few of the books that have eased my way through the year just past, and will
probably do the same for the year ahead.
Before any others, let me mention two or three by friends of The Cresset. Martin Marty (from
whom Cresset readers will hear in the coming year) comes at the reading public twice at least this
year, first with Under God, Indivisible. Though Marty's historical-analytical work is familiar enough
that we may be tempted to think, "There's more?" there always is, both real and surprising at once.
And, in a second guise, as father, colleague and co-see-er, in his book Our Hope for Years to Come
(Augsburg Fortress), Marty and his son, photographer Micah Marty, provide a companion to their
earlier book of texts and pictures for meditation and enlargement of spirit. Walt Wangerin, Jr.whose output is sufficient to make it necessary to witness that he is indeed one person-again has
several titles to make it easy to give yourself or someone else a present of reading that will improve
any afternoon. His major work, The Book of God visits and re-visits our sacred text and reminds us
that taking up residence within its tents would be a full lifetime's share of experience. His most
winning, poignant, perceptive children's book ever is Probity Jones and the Fear Not Angel, and if
you don't have one in your household for the Christmas season, get one quickly and put it with the
Advent things so you will have it for the whole of the season next year. Illustrator Tim Ladwig's angel
alone is worth the price.
I should have written earlier about Writing Home, Alan Bennett's collection of pieces as miscellaneous as an address to the Society for the Preservation of the Book of Common Prayer, theatre
reviews, letters, and journal entries about his thirteen years as host of a lady who lived in a van
parked in his driveway. Bennett was the most incisive of the group who did Beyond the Fringe in the
60s, which is saying something when you remember that the others were Peter Cook, Dudley Moore
and Jonathan Miller. Bennett, whose later career includes a recent movie hit in his play The Madness
of King George, is the English Writer I Should Most Like to Have Tea With. Writing Home will allow
you to hear him in several keys, but his masterpiece may well be the series of short radio monologues
called Talking Heads, which exists also as a recording. Bennett is a great playwight who should have
a much greater audience.
This year's Trollope novel was Framley Parsonage, which will give you a calm and restful place
to spend time, with someone else's dilemma for company. One could do worse than be a reader of
Trollope, if for no other reason than the more than 40 novels, a lifetime of respite. I would not say
the same of David Guterson's Snow Falling on Cedars, though its evocation of time and place (the
Pacific Northwest during the time before and during WWII) is powerful. Equally powerful and
painful is Pat Barker's The Ghost Road, the third in a trilogy of books about WWI. Ghost Road won
the Booker Prize last year; its protagonist is W.H.R. Rivers, the doctor whose work with shell-
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shocked soldiers contributed a good deal to modern counseling therapy. Another fine WWI novel is
Sebastien Japrisot's A Very Long Engagement: mystery, romance, war story and epistolary tour de
force. I had to make myself read it in two sessions, though I wanted to keep turning pages to the end.
Not compelling in the same way, but important for a host of other reasons are Wallace Stegner's
Crossing to Safety, about love and friendship, and David Lodge's Therapy, a serious comic novel
about a sit-com writer whose life is turned around by reading Kierkegaard. Find a copy of Wayne
Fields' book What the River Knows, a book full of meaning even if you are not a white, middle-aged
academic angler.
The coming year? I'm deep into le Carre's Tailor of Panama, and finding it as good as ever.
How does he do it? I am intrigued by the ads for Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance
by Lisa Jardine, though "lavishly illustrated and highly accessible" sounds ominous. Still, can 'an
entirely new approach to the Renaissance" be all bad? Speaking as a medieval sympathizer, I've been
waiting a long time for a more critical view of that so-called golden age. Perhaps this will be it. I hope
to own Alice Munro's Selected Stories (because I think that probably she is the best short story writer
today) and to make more headway at Simon Schama's Landscape and Memory. And this year, I will
read Augustine's Confessions, I promise.
Does God read and write? How else could Heaven be the place where we will have enough
time to read all the books we want to read, interrupted only by dinners at Galatoire's and-for
exercise- the occasional choir rehearsal?
Peace,
GME

ONE SMALL BOY
Could "little town of Bethlehem"
be blest beyond the best of them?
One small boy-and such great joy?
Could Mary carry Heaven's seed
a manger feed Earth's Heaven-need?
Could lowly shepherds watching sheep
hear angel choirs while rabbis sleep?
Could just one star in God's vast sky
make wisemen seek its "where" and "why"?
Could foxy Herod ever gauge
how weak is rage, how small his stage?
Could unsung Joseph, taxes filed,
flee royal wrath, protect the child?
Who can explain such wondrous things
to simple shepherds, mighty kings?
One small boy-and such great joy!

Bernhard Hillila
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Rel!arding a Classic
Mfusions on the ineffable

Charles Vandersee

I

had 'orne good laugh' over The Scadet Lette>' last 'ummor, on 'orne of tho" 'welt't;n•
Southern days when syllables dissolve as the brain cooks into delirium, simm'rin' in its red juices like
pitcooked barb'cue. The book itself, 1850, I was into, not the recent titillating movie, which
reviewers said resembles the Playboy Channel? This fall I'm teaching a section of our lower-division
"Major Authors of American Literature," and it's been a dozen years since revisiting Hester Prynne
and her village.
You remember that before the story begins there's the long autobiographical "CustomHouse" sketch. Hawthorne had a political appointment at quiet Salem, as port collector, and he had
leisure to rummage around the clutter in the custom-house. There he found (he says) the actual
Scarlet Letter and a parchment with Hester's sad story.
Students could read the novel (or, technically, romance) without the "Custom-House"
sketch, but it's a canonical classic, so you want to avoid truncation. Early reviewers thought the
sketch a self-indulgent blunder, but the book wasn't a Classic then. The 40-page sketch is made of
words, which gave the first laugh-lots of words that first-year undergraduates won't know. In
summer delirium I listed some. What effect would ignorance have on their reading and on their
morale? How many class periods would we need? Settle on Cliff's Notes instead?
As God is my witness, the absolutist God of the delirious fundamentalist South, there are 86
alien words. OK, really 131, but give people the benefit of the doubt, a sacrilegious thing to do in
absolutist territory. Some students will know words like countenance, encumbrance, ignominiously,
languid, sacrilegious, torpid, and vicissitude. In this climate they all might know languid and torpid.
But Hawthorne in mid-19th century Massachusetts also used these words: antiquary,
appellations, coadjutors, disapprobation, effusion, emoluments, florid, forbearance, heraldic,
impalpable, inveterately, lucubrations, martyrdom, prate, quickened, sagaciously, talisman,
tremulous, unction, zeal. Going into the first dozen pages of the story itself: behoof, contumely,
evanescent, iniquity, manifest, preternaturally, sepulchres, sumptuary.
A laugh quickened my countenance at this point, producing an effusion of sweat, because
here was one reason that teachers of literature typically relish their work: You often don't know
exactly how seriously to take a writer, even a Major Author, and this uncertainty confers an elite
sensation, a sort of genteel giddiness, denied to ordinary citizens. Literature teachers live in a
different and privileged emotional world. There may be no exact word for the sensation, but it's
produced by the "indeterminacy" of the Great Text.
In the "Custom-House" sketch, isn't Hawthorne using language a bit more florid than
normal, to satirize both himself and the antiquated functionaries that amuse him, "talking together,
in voices between speech and a snore, and with that lack of energy that distinguishes the occupants
of alms-houses?" That is, the book you're about to read isn't all that serious. In the preface to the
second edition he confessed "amusement" at the fuss the "Custom-House" sketch created.
On the other hand, blessed as he was with pre-motorcar, pre-video readers, ready to enfold
themselves on winter nights in the convolutions of well-sewn words, as if under warm comforters,
isn't he writing precisely as he "ought" to be writing? That is, this writer is erudite and serious. And
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oughtn't we try faithfully to become his audience, looking up every word, rather than getting only
the "drift" of things? Especially since this section of the course is for future English majors. Possibly
one has to be an English professor to see low comedy in all this-these decisions that a teacher tries
to make, about what a student will "get" from reading this Classic, on the spectrum between drift
and mastery.
!·shared the laugh that most readers enjoy, in the first few pages of the story itself, beginning
to reread and make notes. Here's Hawthorne's revulsion at his ancestor Puritans: grim, "stern,"
self-righteous. The laugh, though, is not at Hawthorne's hang-ups, so plain to the modern reader:
his obsessive fascination with ancestral social pathology and his horror at the harm that rigid
systems, in a hermetic village, can do to individual human beings. He loved reading the annals and
histories, such as Caleb Snow in 1825, blandly explaining Mistress Hibbins' execution as a witch.
Her "natural crabbedness" of temper increased after her husband's death, and church censure for
quarrelsomeness had no effect. Her temper finally "rendered her so odious to her neighbours as to
cause some of them to accuse her of witchcraft," and when the magistrates rejected the jury's guilty
verdict, "the popular clamour" got her executed anyway.
Echo of Pontius Pilate, and foreshadowing of Arthur Miller's The Crucible, and not very
funny. No, the laugh is provoked instead by Hawthorne's ambition. He seems to be seeking norms
of behavior, for individuals and communities both, with a historian's sensibility. Once one gets an
intimation of this project, the laugh is one of glee, of anticipation. There will either be a great crash
(the project overwhelms, collapses in fatuity) or there will be detour into allegory (different characters standing for different behavioral extremes, which the reader too easily sorts through), or
there will be something new on the face of literature.
Hawthorne, as we all know, being a Classic Author, gives the new, and the U.S. needed it in
1850, when it was still widely held that the nation had not enough history for the thick description
that a fiction writer wants to provide. The laugh is the laugh of posterity that knows Hawthorne's
triumph in evoking heterodox norms of behavior, and with delicacy rather than the slathering trowel.
One norm: Don't live in a village. It takes the whole village to raise a child, says Hillary
Clinton, parroting folk wisdom from Mrica, but when the village raises a child it raises a village
child, provincial and potentially an atrocity. In a village, if you grow up crabby (and your husband,
Mr. Hibbins, late in life loses his fortune, rendering you crankier than ever), you get put to death.
If, like Hester Prynne, you bear one bastard child, you get ostracized for seven years. In a village,
behavior out of the ordinary hardly ever develops, and when it does, it doesn't go unforgiven by
village children, when they degenerate into adults.
Qualification: OK, so if you have to live in a village, look for guidance not to the
authorities. Here Hawthorne doesn't hide his heterodoxy, for once, under that comforter of polysyllables-itself hiding under a colorful and distracting counterpane of symbols. The doctrine being
challenged says that people are basically evil. But although the public "is capable of denying
common justice," "quite as frequently it awards more than justice." The less you demand your
"right," and the more you appeal to the public's "generosity," the more justice you get, in your
dealings with ordinary people. So "individuals in private life" had forgiven Hester for her "frailty,"
while the "rulers" took longer to mellow. It's the "men of rank," of "sour and rigid" face, who think
humanity is in bondage to mischief, and always ready to wreak havoc.
Thus the fatal miscalculation of the quarrelsome Mistress Hibbins is fairly comic. In The
Scarlet Letter, in the prime of life, she intrudes on the two main characters, hoping to enlist them in
the Devil's mischief in the forest. In real life a few years later, threatened with death, she apparently
counts on people's accustomed benevolence, forgetting that this is a village, and the vexed villagers
want her to grovel and just shut up.
Even in Puritan settlements probably not every crabby old crone was hanged, which means
that generally speaking Hawthorne is right: People are not basically evil. But the exceptions
throughout history are too lurid and too frequent-Southern lynchings, to mention one genre-to
rest easily in Hawthorne's doctrine. It's the nervous laugh from the labyrinth here-reader
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wandering guidelessly in search of a general principle. Are small North American communities more
benevolent than not, or are they so only when the "other" stays unstrident and conforming,
invisible, or is there no way of telling?
If there isn't a way of telling, then how do individuals cope? A scholar named Sacvan
Bercovitch has built a whole short book around Hawthorne's statement that "the scarlet letter had
not done its office." As I write this, I haven't yet read it, but a chunk of it is duplicated in The Rites
of Assent, pulled off the shelf at home. Hawthorne means that the village, a powerful theocracy,
failed to induce penitence. You can make a woman wear a badge of ignominy, and you can ostracize
her (though Hester's remote cabin is as much her own will as the village's), but you can't stop her
mind. Years after the adultery, she still regards that act as having "a consecration of its own," and,
worse than that, she's become a philosophress. She concludes that the whole current social system
of man-woman relations is wrong, and norms will be found only in a redoing.
She coped by leaving the village and going into her mind. The passage is long and intricate,
with Hawthorne selecting his words as fastidiously as Caleb Snow:
As a first step [she concluded], the whole system of society is to be torn down and built up anew.

Then, the very nature of the opposite sex, or its long hereditary habit, which has become like nature, is
to be essentially modified, before women can be allowed to assume what seems a fair and suitable
position. Finally, all other difficulties being obviated, woman cannot take advantage of these
preliminary reforms, until she herself shall have undergone a still mightier change; in which, perhaps,
the ethereal essence, wherein she has her truest life, will be found to have evaporated.

Bercovitch is good at this point, calling attention to the fact that 1850, the year of The
Scarlet Letter, is but two years after the great Seneca Falls, New York, women's rights meeting.
Would Hester's views be seen by readers entirely apart from that event? As suggested earlier, in
reading a Classic one wants to keep faith with the Author-and, let's now add, with the Zeitgeist,
not only its difficult words but its evanescent ambience. What's in the air in the northeast U.S. as
Hawthorne writes?
The long passage above is not simply Hester's coping with the village, powerful as it is if
read in that way alone, but Hawthorne's experiment with thick description. Maybe (he thinks to
himself) an American romancer can actually connect the distant past, the 1640s, with the immediate
present (the women's movement of the 1840s) by the simple device of creating a woman character
and giving her a mind! One laughs a rejoicing laugh at the audacity.
And then laughs also at Hawthorne's disarming construction of his own innocence and his
text's indeterminacy. That is, Hester's heretical thoughts-making a new and normative universeoccur not as definitive revelations but only as she "wandered without a clue in the dark labyrinth of
mind." Hester doesn't ground her private new norms on systematic reasoning or scholarship. Thus
Hawthorne escapes endorsing Seneca Falls as solid and advanced thinking. But his text advances
Seneca Falls anyway, since Hester starts living by her new norms. Her life is changed. The indeterminacy of the text (what's Hawthorne's own stance?) enables the reader happily to ponder these
things rather than tiresomely to be told.
Did readers connect past and present? At the library, in a book reprinting early reviews, I
saw most reviewers weren't connecting. The one who did, in the Church Review and Ecclesiastical
Register, made up for the others-who may have taken the connection for granted. Hester sojourns
in Europe after her partner in adultery, the Rev. Mr. Dimmesdale, dies of terror and shame (and
Chillingworth's malign influence). Abroad, her mind keeps working, and it becomes no longer
labyrinthine but solid as the minds of the stern male magistrates. Thus after returning to the village
she assures women of her "firm belief": Heaven will reveal new norms of human behavior. "[A] new
truth would be revealed, in order to establish the whole relation between man and woman on a surer
ground of mutual happiness."
The Church Review man put the 1640s and the 1840s together and was horrified. "The late

Charles Vandersee has
returned to Dogwood,
Virginia, from San
Diego, Glasgow, and
Chicago.

Convention of females at Boston, to assert the 'rights of woman,"' indicated to him that there were
American women primed for those new norms. But for school-girls to read this "dirty story," of characters "wallowing in their filth," was "a thing to be ashamed of." The Christian gospel had already
"set the relations of man and woman where they should be." Like trash TV of a later century, and
pop songs written to formulas, The Scarlet Letter was "a book made for the market," a "commodity."
And (overture to an epidemic) this "nauseous amour of a Puritan pastor" had already "started other
pens on like enterprises."
That, for the time being, was as far as I got. I wanted to think about other novels of the
semester-about Henry James's The Portrait of a Lady, where one norm seems to be: If you're an
American young woman, don't live in Europe. Edith Wharton's The House of Mirth: Don't live in
New York. Kate Chopin's The Awakening: You can't make a go of it even in New Orleans.
This becomes almost pathetically funny-where then do you live? Willa Cather manages to
answer, with The Song of the Lark, about Thea Kronborg from a Colorado village who becomes an
international opera star. You can't live at all unless you have something Boston in the 1640s scarcely
had, which is music and the desire to make music. With that, apparently, you can live anywhere.
Hester's bastard child may have had it-Pearl's laugh was "full of merriment and music." In Europe
she apparently lives happily.
The only music in Hawthorne's early Boston is "military music," "loud and piercing," done
with "no great skill"-the band accompanying the dignitaries and inhabitants through the streets to
minister Dimmesdale's Election Day sermon, his last. A funny thing, as you ponder Hawthorne's
capacity for discerning human norms: According to his 1940s biographer, Randall Stewart,
Hawthorne "always professed an inability to enjoy music."

pond fox
Our steps are softer
winter nights
the fire throws noise and light
into darkness we
would keep covered
but
we cup our hot tea
in both hands
and do not speak
as the gathering dark
spreads over house
trees
burrows
while below the barn the lone fox
paws at the thin ice crystals
at the pond's edge.

J. T.
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Ledbetter

On Literary Classics
personal preferences

I. (re)reading Augustine's Confessions

"And in all these things over which I range as I am consulting you I find no secure
place for my soul except in you, and in you I pray that what is scattered in me may be
brought together so that nothing of me may depart from you."
To reach a certain point in life, the point we describe as "middle age" and locate differently depending
on how old we happen to be, is quite often to feel "scattered." One's energies are dispersed in countless
different directions-work, whether paid or unpaid; children, whether relatively grown or still at
home; parents, whose continuing claim on us is not diminished; friends, who may themselves be
scattered hither and yon.
That sense of being "scattered" St. Augustine knew well, as the passage above from his
Confessions demonstrates. He knew also what it means to have achieved a good deal but not to have
found in such achievements the "sweetness" we seek. "I panted for honors, for money, for marriage,
and you were laughing at me. I found bitterness and difficulty in following these desires, and your
graciousness to me was shown in the way you would not allow me to find anything sweet which was not
you." And he knew what it meant to have come a long way and, yet, to see a long road stretching out
ahead. "It is one thing to see from a mountaintop in the forests the land of peace in the distance ... ,
and it is another thing to hold to the way that leads there .... "
In his wonderful biography, Augustine of Hippo, Peter Brown notes that at the time Augustine
wrote the Confessions, a time when he had only begun his work as a bishop of the church in North
Mrica, he had good reason to introduce himself to his fellow Christians. But, Brown notes, "only a very
profound, inner reason would have led him to write a book such as the Confessions: he was entering
middle-age." This alone might be reason enough for one who has never read the Confessions, or has
read only as far as the conversion in Book VIII and missed the magnificent Book X, or has read the
whole but cannot recall being either instructed or moved by it, to have another go at it. Perhaps one can
even learn to say of this great work what Augustine says of God: "Late it was that I loved you, beauty
so ancient and so new, late I loved you!"
Whatever reasons move us to take up the Confessions, there is much to be learned from the book
that some regard as the first autobiography in our culture's history. Augustine asks of us a crucial
decision: We must decide whether he is right to claim that the human heart-our heart-is driven by a
longing to which only God answers. For if that is true, if we long to rest in One who is not an object of
ordinary human experience, then we are given a sobering vision of life. Robert Meagher has described
succinctly the choice with which Augustine presents us. Happiness requires that we (1) love the good
rightly-which means, love God, who is the highest and unchanging good, above all else; and that we
(2) "possess" the good we love. The pathos of our life is that-within human history-these two
requirements are incompatible. Therefore, we must choose either (1) to love rightly but not possess the
good we love, or (2) to love a good that can be possessed but that cannot finally satisfy the heart's
longing. "Here I have the power but not the wish to stay; there I wish to be but cannot; both ways,
miserable."
Augustine, of course, made his decision, and the Confessions invites us to do likewise. Deferring
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"possession" of the good, Augustine comes to understand himself as a pilgrim. This man who, as Peter
Brown puts it, "always resented travelling" and "associated it with a sense of protracted labour and of
the infinite postponement of his dearest wishes" will now come to use it as "the most characteristic
image of the spiritual life in his middle age." For those who suppose themselves to have graduated
beyond the sentiment of the hymn, "I'm but a stranger here; heav'n is my home," a dose of the
Confessions , reminding us that we are pilgrims and foreigners, may be salutary. Not that Augustine
himself has mastered the art of loving this world without clinging to it. He knows that he is deeply
drawn to the delights of our world, and he often has a hard time knowing whether to enjoy these
delights or to "pass on" from them to the One who gives them and to whom they point. He knows the
many occasions when he is "sitting at home and ... [his] attention is attracted by a lizard catching flies
or by a spider entangling them in his web," and he worries lest he delight too much in these curiosities
and forget God. Augustine does not resolve the problem of how to love all else in relation to God, but
he invites us unforgettably into reflecting on this central problem for human life and love.
And he manages to do all this while ultimately directing our attention away from ourselves, away
from the narcissism that is natural to the young and pitiable in the middle-aged. Few readers find the
long interpretation of Genesis in books XII and XIII of the Confessions to be the high point of the work;
indeed, most readers simply skip these last two books. Such a choice is understandable; certainly they
could never be as gripping as the story Augustine tells in the earlier books. And, indeed, interpreters
have often been puzzled, wondering what Augustine can possibly be doing. Some have even been drawn
to the view that Augustine is simply "clearing his desk," seizing the opportunity to answer questions that
have been directed to him.
Perhaps so. We cannot say for certain. But I suspect that we do him an injustice if we do not see
more than this. Having drawn his readers into pondering their own deepest longings, Augustine also
sets them free of such endless introspection. They are travelers-on the way toward God. Hence, their
attention-our attention-is directed to what is outside the self: from the mystery of the single individual ("man who is only a small portion of what you have created") to the entire creation, all part of a
vast movement back to the Creator. To be delivered from constant attention to one's self, to have one's
gaze redirected toward God, toward that "beauty so ancient and so new," is a great gift to be given at
any age.
Gilbert Meilaender
Board of Directors Chair of Christian Ethics

II. going after Stevenson's treasure

"I learn we are going after treasure-hear it from my own hands, mind you. Now, treasure is
ticklish work; I don't like treasure voyages on any account; and I don't like them, above all,
when they are secret, and when . . .the secret has been told to the parrot."
"Silver's parrot?" asked the squire.
"It's a way of speaking," said the captain.
-Treasure Island, ch. IX
What happens, in a pirate tale, when the secret is told to the parrot? Squire Trelawny, slow of mind
though perfect with a gun, takes the captain's phrase literally and then has to be instructed in the nature
of metaphor and idiomatic phrases. But maybe his literal-mindedness is not so naive as it seems. The
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"secret" spoken by the parrot is this novel's familiar tag line-"pieces of eight! pieces of eight!"
According to the one-legged man who dominates the novel, the parrot has every right to say these
words-even if he doesn't understand them. The parrot, named Old Flint in honor of a deceased
bucaneer, has assisted for hundreds of years at more maritime disasters and horrors than Silver could
shake a crutch at. Who better than this long-lived and monstrously well-informed bird to repeat the one
monotonous phrase, the "secret" around which Treasure Island is organized?
The content of this "secret" is surprisingly difficult to specify. Treasure Island is a book about a
particular kind of fear, a kind occasioned by treasure and pirates but with some larger-and largely
unnameable-object. The tone of the book is established in six memorable opening chapters, set at the
inn run by Jim Hawkins's parents. Billy Bones, the unlucky inheritor of a treasure map, lives in hiding
at the inn, drinking to forget his past; when his former mate Blind Pew arrives to deliver the Black Spot,
he is so frightened (and so weakened by alcohol) that he has a stroke and is forced to sit, half-paralyzed,
waiting for his doom. He dies before it arrives: No violence is necessary. In the shadow of this event,
Hawkins's mother tries to count out the rent money Bones owes her, but his corpse is right there, some
very bad men are about to pay a visit, and she's having a bit of trouble with exchange rates (all the coins
are foreign). No wonder, after relinquishing her financial calculations, that she manages a self-predicted
faint just as the pirates arrive, yielding herself up to the prospect of certain death which they represent.
Blind Pew-how mobile are the handicapped in Treasure Island!-taps his way into the tale and the inn,
but before long, in a state of unreasoning panic ("You won't leave old Pew, mates!"), he has run right
into the horses of an oncoming constabulary and been trampled down. If the parrot is immune from
fear, most of the other characters wallow in it, scaring themselves if necessary, and thus opening themselves to death on account of the treasure they all, without exception, crave.
It is Jim Hawkins himself who embodies this pattern of behavior most vividly, who enacts fear
as a death-wish, a "mad notion" which leads him on restlessly and irrationally from one adventure to
another. Like Pew, Jim runs away from danger and into it simultaneously, horribly afraid of a fate he
often invites. Instead of staying with his friends, he impulsively piles into a boat when the pirates are
first about to land on the island. From that point on, his course can hardly be predicted by anyone, least
of all by himself. He wants to die, or to find the treasure, to be a pirate, or perhaps to be a hero. Midway
through his exploits, Jim sets out to sea in a "coracle" fashioned by Ben Gunn, a sort of feeble-minded
Robinson Crusoe, and when he discovers the laws of sailing in this peculiar little vessel, he discovers as
well the nature of action in the world of Treasure Island. You can't steer a coracle. You have to curl up
in it, letting it make its own way. Just occasionally, you can pop up, give a push, and hope for the best.
You're probably going to drown. The coracle turns out to be a way of abandoning oneself, of waiting
for extinction in a state of expectant and somewhat breathless fear, fear brought on by one's own wilful
decisions.
Jim, of course, survives his fears and his inexplicable impulses. In surviving, though, he comes
to live in the fruitless circularity of the story whose narrator he has become. "Oxen and wain-ropes
would not bring me back again to that accursed island; and the worst dreams that ever I have are when
I hear the surf booming about its coasts, or start upright in bed, with the sharp voice of Captain Flint
still ringing in my ears: 'Pieces of eight! pieces of eight!' " The parrot's phrase retains the capacity to
frighten him, to blight his life with a sickening, dizzying panic. It is a secret-one finally realizes-that
can never completely be told-not in this version, anyway. Jim refuses to return to the cursed island
(where there is still treasure waiting to be lifted); therefore he must, in his mind, return, the parrot's
words ringing in his ears every time he has his favored nightmare.
It is instructive to find that the childhood tale, the tale supposedly written for a child, is so
intent on marking out a pathology of fear, panic, and self-destructive longing. Stevenson must have
realized the problematic and disturbingly unfinished nature of his essay in children's literature, for ten
years after the publication of Treasure Island he rewrote it as The Wrecker, taking as a collaborator the
boy (now an adult) whom he had meant, a decade before, to entertain. The curious reader who has
come back to Treasure Island, who has discovered its formal brilliance, its intricate psychological games,
and its utter inability to state its subject, should also try The Wrecker, a fascinating effort to shut up the

parrot ... or at least to speak its secret more explicitly. Though it lacks the concision and elegance of

Treasure Island, The Wrecker accomplishes what the earlier book never could, for all its careful cruelties.
It abandons the eighteenth century. It gives the treasure, the parrot's secret, a local habitation and a
name. It transforms Treasure Island for an age of capital accumulation, capitalist robber-barons, and
global markets. The modern tale of adventure has found its "objective correlative." Stevenson imagines,
as only a hidebound Tory could, the horror not only of death, panic, and pieces of eight but the
ineluctable logic of success in the free market.
Richard Maxwell
Professor of English

III. reading and rereading T.S. Eliot

Watching Danny DeVito's screen version of Roald Dahl's Matilda proved unsettling to me. My thirteenyear-old granddaughter didn't seem to share the general laughter and enthusiasm. On the way home I
asked whether she thought the film was fun. She answered with only the slightest condescension, that
it was okay but that the movie wasn't nearly as good as the book, which, she added, she had read four
or five times. Well, one great delight of retirement is following on a reading whim. So I read Matilda,
even slowly, to absorb the truism once again. Although the film tries to capture the narrator's voice, it
simply cannot represent the verbal nuances we attribute to what Philip Wheelwright spoke of long ago
as the "radical perspectivity" of our finest artists. Absent from the film are gentle but pointed asides,
from regard for C.S. Lewis' Narnia Tales to reservations about Lewis' lack of humor, from caustic irony
on Ms. Truncbull or Matilda's family, to understatement about childhood loyalties.
Thus, when asked to recommend a text for reading or rereading (to use S.T. Coleridge's quick
definition of the classic), I found myself listening for a voice and turning to T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets.
This slim and easily portable paperback continues to provide me with a literary map for finding one's
way in human experience. Its perspective, like the prophet Isaiah's assurances about teachers who guide
us from behind with their voices, offers some truths about our world without destroying us. It offers
hope, even consolation, without lies or deception, and along the way it invigorates with its language and
imagery, mediating between the everyday and the possible.
I was first introduced to T.S. Eliot as a high school senior when, in an evening chapel service,
a precocious upperclassman, named Martin E. Marty, read Thomas Becket's homily from Murder in the
Cathedral to puzzled and agitated hearers. In the summer after my sophomore year I took a course at
the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. Our instructor, a specialist in James Joyce from Madison,
took us through selected prose and poetry of the Post World War I period, including Eliot's earlier
poetry. I found Eliot's clerky skepticism compelling, even as an undergraduate. I cannot remember
when I first read Four Quartets. I do know that I continue to struggle with obscure passages in the
poem, passages about which Eliot, quoting Robert Browning, claimed that only God at present knew
the precise meaning. And, like the priest in some liturgical rites who turns to parishoners and asks for
forgiveness, I have wanted to turn to students on one or two occasions where we have tried to work
through the poem in class and ask for pardon if studying the work severed their regard for it. Yet I have
kept returning to it. And although I can only speak about the work here, and that only a brief section of
it, I do so with a small sense of the discovery one still has when listening to the distinctive voices here
in the poem.
In the "Dry Salvages," a third section in the longer poem integrated by the destructive and
regenerating power of water, the speaker in the poem, let's say Eliot for brevity's sake, uses the words
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"ground swell" twice in a relatively brief passage to depict the ocean surface's unhurried movement and
in that motion to evoke a kind of fascinating dread about the human experience of time. At first I liked
the way Eliot succeeded with words, slippery and sliding as they are, ultimately imprecise, failing, and
discardable (think of what has happened to Eliot today). And, like Herman Melville before him, I liked
the way Eliot, with "ground swell" reached out to landlubbers like me. Having read the lines fairly
often, however, I don't think I ever grasped some of their fuller implications until I gazed down and out
at the Atlantic off Gloucester, Massachusetts, and until I began to face my own aging.
I was struck, for example, on rereading La Rochefoucauld's Maxims by his counterposition to
most of our popular notions about smooth evolutionary and developmental stages on life's way. "We
arrive as novices at each successive stage of life," he asserts, "and often lack experience to cope with it,
not withstanding the number of our years." Each reader picks up the prosaic observation by feeling her
or his own pulse. La Rochefoucauld returns to a related proposition with a more ample image in a
supplemental maxim on amour-propre or self-love: "In the physical world it may be compared to the
sea, in the ceaseless ebb and flow of whose waves it finds its true emblem of the perpetual turmoil of its
thoughts and eternal unrest." Now in the passage we are referring to from Four Quartets, Eliot arrests
the motion in this kind of potential image, compacts it with thought and feeling on the opacity of
human experience, and he has the "ground swell" of the ocean ring the bell-really sound out-in
measures that are beyond human measure. In his extended metaphor he recapitulates, so to speak, the
yearning and loss in our human predicament. What is more, the sound of that "ground swell" anticipates a change in direction in the poem. We hear a change in voice, a formal six-stanza sestina that
begins with the "calamitous annunciation" the death bell anticipates and ends with "only the hardly,
barely prayable/ Prayer of the one Annunciation." Eliot has left open the specific referent of that one
Annunciation, just as later he will allude to Krishna, both creator and destroyer, to further his readers
on their pilgrimage throughout the poem. We often consider Four Quartets Eliot's farewell to poetry.
It may have been. Yet the speaker in the poem, "unappeased and peregrine," addresses us with words
above and beyond the adieus. If we cup our ears and listen, we still hear the stronger voices about being
explorers, about fareing forward if we can't fare well, about being consumed by fire or fire, about the
final rose, when "rose and fire are one."
Warren Rubel
Professor Emeritus of Humanities in Christ College

The Psychology of Molecules
the Conestoga wagon theory

Seymour Meyerson

Not only literature
is classic.
Dr. Meyerson, for
many years a senior
research chemist
with Amoco
Corporation,
and recently the
recipient of an
honorary degree
from VU,
enlightens a classic
discussion about
molecules with an
unexpected lesson
about
human behavior.

w . u m a n s have come to «cognize, albeit often slowly and <eluctandy, that we a<e
related in innumerable ways to other life forms. Medical researchers capitalize on anatomical and
psychological similarities with rats, mice, dogs, etc. to help them to better understand how things
work in the human body and to develop and test ways of dealing with things that have gone awry.
Behavioral scientists have found clues to the behavior of humans in that of other animals, including
especially primates. As a biochemist friend put it, the largest gap by far between categories of things
constituting our world is that between the animate and the inanimate. Nonetheless, as a research
chemist concerned largely with reactions of single isolated molecules, I have long been alert to
parallels between the behavior of molecules-clearly part of the inanimate world-and that of
humans. I have found such parallels fun to recognize and often instructive as well.
I worked for nearly forty years with mass spectrometry. In this technique, a sample is vaporized
into an evacuated chamber and there subjected to impact by a beam of electrons of known energy. A
hit may ionize a molecule, that is, kick an electron out of it, leaving it with a net positive charge. In
addition, it may plunk excess energy into the molecules, leaving the ion in an "excited" state, which
may in turn lead to dissociation. The instrument measures and records the resulting ion distribution
by mass. This distribution, the mass spectrum, especially with the help of additional, auxiliary,
measurements, can be decoded to tell us much about the sample, the molecular events occurring in
the instrument, and other aspects of the chemistry and physics involved. The vocabulary of chemists
contains many terms that are shared with social scientists, and "excited," as used here, is a good
example. It means that a molecule-the ion in this work-is jumping or vibrating more or less wildly,
seeking a way to rid itself of the excess energy so it can relax, that is, return to a resting condition.
The vapor pressure in the ionization chamber of the mass spectrometer is low enough that, for
the few microseconds during which a molecule contributes the data being collected, it never
encounters another molecule. We might say that the molecule under study sees itself as alone in the
universe. In most of more-conventional chemistry, each molecule is surrounded by and constantly
jostling against neighbors. An excited molecule in such a social environment may share its excitation
energy with neighboring molecules or it may attack-chemically react with-them, in either case
dissipating the energy and lowering the residual level of of excitation. But in my system the molecule
under study is isolated; it has no neighbors. Its only options are to bite its own tail or otherwise
recognize itself and/or to go to pieces, which we refer to as rearrangement and dissociation.
All of this might be summarized by saying that I have been concerned with the individual
psychology of molecules, isolated in space, whereas most of conventional chemistry is concerned
with their behavior in the presence of great numbers of other molecules, that is, their sociology.
My colleagues and I have studied a set of molecules in which hydrogen atoms are removed
from a long flexible chain of carbon atoms and transferred to oxygen atoms that are part of a
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compact structural grouping. The presence of the originally distant hydrogen atoms close enough to
the oxygens to allow them to be plucked off the chain and bound to the oxygen suggests that the
flexible chain, provided that it is long enough, tends to fold back and coil around the oxygencontaining group, as depicted in the figure. Such behavior might be viewed as an attempt to
approach conditions in the liquid phase, in which all parts of the molecule are in close contact with
the same or neighboring molecules.
In looking for similar behavior in other contexts, the first and perhaps best chemical analogy
that I have identified is the polymer chemist's model for flexible polymers in dilute solution in poor
solvents. The term "dilute solution" is used here to mean that the solute molecules are so few and so
widely dispersed that they only rarely encounter one another. "Poor solvent" means one in which the
solute and solvent molecules have chemical characteristics so different that they are unable to relate
to each other, like oil and water. A familiar example of such a system is viscosity-index (VI)
improvers in lubricating oil. VI improvers are long, flexible molecules that at moderate temperatures
are unable to relate chemically to the surrounding oil molecules and hence coil into a tight ball, minimizing the surface exposed to a foreign environment. If the concentration of the solute is increased,
solute molecules will meet more frequently, and when they do they will uncoil from the tightly
wound balls and coil about each other. That is, they recognize each other as like them and hence as
friends and respond accordingly. If the solute is kept in dilute solution but moved to a series of
progressively better solvents, a point is reached at which the solute molecules feel enough at home
that they uncoil. Alternatively, even in a poor solvent, raising the temperature suffeciently will
prompt the solute molecules to uncoil. Thus, the VI improver effectively removes itself from
solution at low temperatures but at higher temperatures goes into solution, where its large size helps
to counteract the decrease in oil viscosity brought on by rising temperature. The isolated molecules
in the rarefied atmosphere of the mass spectrometer may be considered as an infinitely dilute
solution in an infinitely poor solvent. Here, too, raising the initial gas temperature or-as an alternative way to introduce additional excitation energy into the molecules-increasing the energy of
the ionizing electrons reduces the extent of the hydrogen migration process, presumably by reducing
the extent of the coiling
that makes the hydrogen
migration possible.
The analogy may
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monomolecular films of oil on the surface of water tend to form circular islands. Similarly, a recent
article on heavy-metal poisoning contains a statement that I found startling. It reads, "In its liquid
form, mercury is surprisingly nontoxic-people have ingested ounces with little effect-because it
has such a high surface tension that it balls up easily, leaving very little surface area to interact with
the body." In each of these instances, a collection of identical or similar molecules, looking out at an
environment that it perceives to be different from itself and hence unfriendly, tries to attain a config-
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uration that will minimize the surface exposed to the outside world. The behavior of the VI
improver in oil or of the isolated molecule in a high vacuum suggests that this pattern persists as the
number of molecules is reduced, down to the limiting case of a single molecule.
Shifting our focus now to the human scene, wherever we look we see that members of our
species have subdivided our communities into categories of people who are seen by others and who
see themselves as different from many of their neighbors. We have defined in-groups and outgroups, which we perceive as us and them.
Most obviously, the human race has divided itself into a great number of nations or countries.
At a minimum these nations generally set up mechanisms to discourage or at least control movement
of people and traffic across their borders. Our history is filled with instances in which nations or
blocs of nations have come to view each other as deadly enemies and have resorted to the wholesale
killing that we call war. Within a country, we divide ourselves according to all kinds of bases and
build barriers to keep the groups apart. We sort people by nationalities determined by where their
ancestors came from, often many generations back. We sort them by the regions within the country
where they live. We sort them by their belief systems and by political and economic outlooks. We sort
them by language. We sort them by skin color, sometimes extending this to only slight differences in
shading.
Between the groups we establish pecking orders and promote fear and distrust. Within the
groups we teach a sense of superiority and preach exclusiveness. In innumerable ways we institute
legal restrictions and generate social pressures to ensure that the barriers we have constructed are
honored. Even within such groups we reduce further the numbers of people whom we are willing to
accept as peers by drawing lines on the basis of age, gender, education, occupation, and income.
Some or all of these distinctions, the social mechanisms that keep them in place, and the strong
emotional reactions associated with them seem to characterize all human societies. Sometimes, as a
result of history and of social arrangements, these criteria are closely correlated and tend to reinforce
each other. Sometimes they may be in conflict. For example, when a nation is at war, animosities
between groups within the nation are likely to be temporarily set aside or at least downplayed. An
analogy may be drawn here to the uncoiling of VI improvers in a lubricating oil when the
temperature of the oil is elevated.
Both the human and molecular behavior patterns described here may be looked on as variants
of the defense strategy associated with homesteaders travelling across the western plains of North
America in their covered wagons in the nineteenth century. Fearing possible attacks by hostile
Indians, these groups in setting up camp arranged their wagons in a circle, with the women and
children on the inside and armed men on guard around the perimeter. A non-chemist friend,
listening to me expound on the parallelism described here, suggested that it be dubbed "the
Conestoga wagon theory," whence the subtitle of this article.
The big difference, of course, between molecules and people in this context is that molecules
have no choice. How they will respond to their surroundings is their chemistry; it is an integral part
of their being. We humans, in contrast, can pick and choose whom we wish to consider as friends or
as enemies, as well as define the criteria that we will use to categorize our neighbors. Our history
documents any number of instances in which we have expanded markedly the dimensions of our ingroups, increasing with each step the size of the community within which we can feel comfortable.
These examples demonstrate that in human communities, unlike molecules, we have the capacity to
transform the societal counterpart of a poor solvent to that of a good solvent by purposeful action
and do not need a rise in temperature to prompt us to uncoil. Ultimately we can expand the group
within which we feel at home to embrace the entire human race. We have choices.
I make no claim of profundity in pointing out parallel behaviors of people and molecules, but
the exercise does enable one to look at both from unusual angles, which may contribute some added
insights to both contexts.
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where's Nahum Tate when you need him?

James Combs

Last spring I had occasion to visit Stratfordupon-Avon. It was a rainy Sunday, curiously
devoid of the tourist buses, and thus easy to
saunter around. I went to the usual haunts of the
Shakespeare industry-Anne Hathaway's
cottage, Shakespeare's birthplace, the burial site
with the famous curse carved in stone in the
chancel of Holy Trinity Church. After a pub
lunch and a pint (actually, several) at the Black
Swan (known locally as "the Dirty Duck"), the
sun came out on a cheery May afternoon. For
hours, I walked and sat on the banks of the river
Avon, watched the swans and the breeze through
the weeping willows, and basked in the thought
that he-the Bard himself-the local boy who
went to the big city and made good and then
came back home-walked these banks as both a
young and old man. Shakespeare always strikes
me as someone I would have really liked to have
known, and I fantasized about him sitting down
on a riverside bench with me and chatting all
afternoon about life and death and love and all
those humane subjects he expressed better than
anyone. I could take leave of him convinced of
the astounding breadth and depth of his mind,
truly (as Matthew Arnold wrote) "out-topping
knowledge." A not-isolated opinion. The
eminent critic Harold Bloom recently wrote that
Shakespeare, "aside from all his other preternatural strengths, gives me the constant
impression that he knows more than anyone else
ever has known." Most scholars would call that
impression an illusion, but to me it seems the
pragmatic truth. Knowing myself, knowing
Shakespeare, and knowing God are three
separate but closely related quests.
Since then, I have been reading
Shakespeare, and biographies and interpretations of him. Like my fantasy encounter with

him on the banks of the Avon, everyone who
writes about him interprets every scrap of
evidence we have of him, with hope of
discovering the workings of that "victorious
brow." Who is this guy? I'm sure literary
historians would sell their souls for the discovery
of a diary, or a cache of letters, anything that
clues us as to what made this rather obscure and
matter-of-fact figure tick, the pedestrian fellow
who, as Northrop Frye remarked, wrote two
plays a year for immediate performance over
twenty years and then quit and retired to
Stratford to count the take. There is even scant
evidence that Shakespeare was astoundingly
careless about his literary reputation, suggesting
that he didn't regard what he had done to have
been anything remarkable or lasting. If so, that
must be the most tantalizing mystery to those of
us awed by his talent: did he not know, or care,
that he was the Immortal Bard out-topping
knowledge? Did he think that Hamlet and
Taming of the Shrew and A Midsummer Night's
Dream were to be throwaways?
If there is anything to this thesis, perhaps
this helps explain Shakespeare's fearlessness, his
bold examination of touchy and difficult
subjects, including political power. (They were,
he could contend, only plays.) Consider how
powerful people around the throne might have
disliked the scene in Henry V in which the King,
at a desperate moment when the French counterattack at Agincourt, orders against military
tradition, "Then every soldier kill his
prisoners;"after a hesitation, the King then
chillingly orders, "Give the word through," and
the French are killed. Shakespeare was no doubt
familiar with Holinshed's dreadful description
of the merciless slaughter; in some versions, a
scene-ending line (from the 1600 "bad" Quarto
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version) is included after the King's order, when
the comic sidekick Pistol exclaims "Coup' la
gorge!" and cuts the throat of his prisoner, who
had just promised Pistol the traditional ransom.
Strong stuff. And what of mad Lear, witnessing
the raw grasp for power among his beloved
daughters, cynically concluding of those who
would rule, "Through tattered clothes small
vices do appear; Robes and furred gowns hide
all." And Lear's ultimate questions about the
meaningless of it all: "As flies to wanton boys are
we to th' gods/ They kill us for their sport."
Tough stuff. King Lear is especially hard to take
in its unrelenting bleakness, and it is common
for readers (Samuel Johnson included) to object
to the ending-no reconciliation, justice, or
hope.
It is a tribute to Shakespeare's fearlessness in
tackling such grim events and large questions
that subsequent ages and productions have felt it
necessary to amend the Bard. The frank sexual
play of the comedies was altogether too raucous
for the Victorians, so it was likely then to see his
great sex comedies without much mention of
sex. It became common to perform Henry Vas a
portrayal of an ideal prince swelling with
patriotic pride, omitting the entire prisonericing scene. Interestingly, both the Olivier and
Branagh movie versions of Henry V leave the
scene out entirely; such unchivalrous murder
undermines the reputation of the King and the
Good Guys a bit too much, and even smacks of a
rather blatant war crime.
Shakespeare was so upsetting that previous
ages tolerated "improved" versions with not
only scenes omitted but endings changed. Long
ago one Nahum Tate (1652-1715) made
something of a career of cutting-and-pasting the
Bard to produce happy endings. With Tate as coauthor, Richard II doesn't die in prison, and
Romeo and Juliet don't commit suicide but
rather get married. Tate shamelessly redid King
Lear, restoring sanity and crown to Lear,
Cordelia to life, marrying her off to Edgar and
then making her queen. He has Lear say,
"Cordelia shall be a queen/ Winds catch the
sound/ And bear it on your rosy wings to heaven/
Cordelia is a queen," and effusing to her new
hubby, "My Edgar, Oh!-Truth and Vertue shall
at last succeed." Such smiley-face philistinism no
doubt roused the once-careless Shakespeare, in
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his niche in the Celestial Library, to compose a
curse on Nahum Tate.
Alas, Tate was only an early practitioner of
the fine art of bowdlerizing (named for the nineteenth century editor Thomas Bowdler), expurgating classic texts of their objectionable and
indelicate and unpatriotic and whatever other
faults and errors. Shakespeare was too big to be
banned, but he could be made to dance to a
happier and more respectable tune. And the
Bard was not alone experiencing the results of
the urge to red-pencil the strong and rough stuff
out. Long ago one devout bowdlerizer decided
to produce a version of the Arthurian legend
devoid of any mention of an adulterous romance
between Lancelot and Guinevere. And the
practice of changing endings to make the story
more palatable continues as classics become
translated into popular cultural fare. Thus
Hawthorne's brooding tale of Puritan repression
and guilt is redone into a star vehicle for Demi
Moore, whose sexy Hester Prynne runs off with
Reverend Dimmesdale in the end! Hugo's
repulsive hunchback becomes Disneyized into a
cutsey poo mascot, and Hans Christian
Andersen's little mermaid doesn't die brokenhearted but rather marries the handsome prince.
The list is endless: there have been movie
versions of Moby Dick wherein Ahab survives
the duel with the white whale, and goes home to
wife and cottage in New Bedford; of Anna
Karenina in which Anna is reunited with
Vronsky after her husband dies on cue; and of
The Glass Menagerie wherein the lonely cripple
Laura and her happy mother await a dashing
gentleman caller.
Perhaps the most notorious episode in
movie history of rewriting and reshooting to
achieve a "sensible"ending (meaning happier or
more hopeful, and thus not as unsettling to
anticipated audiences) was the case of Orson
Welles' The Magnificent Ambersons. Welles
adapted Booth Tarkington's tale of the torturous
decline of an important Midwestern family in
the wake of social change with sympathy and
care, framing it with his usual cinematic genius.
But Welles left the completed film to the tender
mercies of studio hacks, who after a poor
preview showing, proceeded to fiddle with it,
cutting bleaker aspects of it out completely,
and-you guessed it-reshooting a happy

ending. Some film critics think in its original
form it may well have been the greatest
American film. But those forgotten lamebrains at
the studio destroyed what they cut, so there is no
chance of restoration. Nahum Tate and Thomas
Bowdler would have fit right in at RKO.
The impulse to expurgate involves many
motives. Not the least important of these is the
fear of great art and literature. The best that has
been said, written, and visualized is often just
too much for the small-minded. I'm sure every
literature teacher in the world has had to
contend with those students who just can't deal
with eloquence, complexity, and imagination.
And probably every library board has had to deal
with objections to this and that being available.
Those committed to complacency wish to
sustain the illusion of normal and happy life by
restricting what is thought and expressed to the
predictable and respectable. But great art and
literature is not safe nor is it sensible; indeed, the
complacent are quite right in thinking it
subversive. And one of the ways it is subversive is
to remind us that life has few happy endings, and
often very sad or complicated endings. The sunny
side is rhetorical fare for ministers, politicians,
and self-help gurus, appealing to that most hoped
for but perhaps least realized ending:" ... and they
lived happily ever after." But art and literature
discomfit us by portraying no such endings: Lear
and Cordelia are not revived and restored; Anna
Karenina does commit suicide; at the play's end,
Laura is still crippled and alone. The complacent
urge then is to change such endings: life cannot
end that way, either in art or in reality. In that
spirit, perhaps we should propose to some foundation dedicated to the perpetuation of
complacency the funding of the Nahum Tate
Institute for Sensible Endings. Fellows in this
"ministry of happy truth" could rework the
classics to be nonthreatening and heartwarming.
I can see it now: sensible versions of "downer"
endings revised. Medea appears on Jennie Jones
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and is tearfully reconciled with her kids. Hamlet
goes into therapy and accepts his new stepfather.
Faust abandons his quest and becomes a business
school dean. Ahab gets rich in the herring trade.
Heathcliff and Catherine become bridge
partners. Nora and Torvald Helmer reconcile
and write a book about their marital recovery.
Catherine Barkley delivers a healthy baby, and
she and Frederic Henry become active in the
P.T.A. in Grand Rapids. Willy Loman develops a
TV infomercial plugging his second career
success in real estate investing. To everyone's
delight, Mr. Godot shows up and apologizes for
being late. Such an agenda of under-topping
knowledge would have the salutary effect of
increasing human sappiness. No need for a
Fahrenheit 451 solution when all things in all
stories work out for the best. All books would
become Bennettian books of virtue, since they
would promote the authoritative stake in belief
that virtue is rewarded. (Or is it: reward is
virtue?) Attacks on the study of literature or
popular culture would be unnecessary when
improvements can be made in how things turn
out. The Nahum Tate Institute would thereby
serve a valuable public service, insuring that
Truth and Virtue shall at last succeed. But such
inanity will draw the wrath of the Bard, who,
from his lofty perch in the Celestial Library, will
remind us of the folly of such desperate selfassurance that everything is, and will be, all
right:
But man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As make the angels weep.

(Measure for Measure, II, 2)

You tell 'em, Will, baby.
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Neil Jordan is one of the most puzzling
moviemakers currently at work in world cinema.
His film career has been wildly uneven. At his
best, in pictures like Mona Lisa (1986) and The
Crying Game (1992), he stands with a small
group of preeminent filmmakers. At his worst, in
a trifle like the 1987 comedy High Spirits or in
the overblown, egregious Interview With the
Vampire (1993), Jordan seems not to know what
he's doing. Lots of people laughed at Interview
With the Vampire which was supposed to be a
highbrow, multi-layered "literary" picture, but
nobody laughed at High Spirits. Jordan's current
effort, Michael Collins, stands somewhere in
between his great work and his embarrassments.
It's a serious film that dares to tackle a difficult
subject. But it succeeds at few of its objectives.
And though the director has denied the charge
with some annoyance, it's hard to understand
Michael Collins as anything other than a defense
of terrorist homicide.
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apology for murder
Written and directed by Jordan and based on the
life of a leading, early twentieth-century Irish
revolutionary, Michael Collins stars Liam
Neeson as the title character, a bold and
charismatic urban warrior. We meet Collins on
the day in 1916 when he and a group of rebels
surrender after the Easter Rising, a brief insurrection by Irish republicans against the
centuries- old British presence in their Emerald
Isle. The leaders of the revolt, with the exception
of the American Eamon De Valera (Alan
Rickman), are all executed, and such soldiers as
Collins and his best friend Harry Boland (Aidan
Quinn) serve two-year terms in prison.
When Collins and Boland are released,
they immediately return to their revolutionary

l21 The Cresset Christmas I Epiphany 11996-1997

advocacy, and Collins proves himself a
compelling speaker and a superb organizer.
Eventually, with De Valera also out of prison, the
revolutionaries declare themselves a rump
government with De Valera as President of the
Irish
Republic. This is a conscious fiction, of course, a
formal pretext for continued insurrectionist
activities. No one except the men in the revolutionary cell have voted for De Valera. But each of
the rebels awards himself a title of some kind.
Collins and Boland, among others, call themselves Ministers. Meanwhile, the British
government, of course, regards all of them as
treasonous outlaws.
The first of the film's two turning points
comes when Collins determines that Irish independence can only be won if Britain's elaborate
system of internal spying is destroyed. Collins
declares that anyone collaborating with the Brits
will be shot and that any British citizen formally
involved in the "occupation" will also become a
military target. Those in league with Collins and
his newly declared Irish Republican Army
(I.R.A.) regard their strategy as guerrilla
warfare. The British deem it domestic terrorism.
Whatever name the tactic goes by, it is depicted
as instrumental in forcing the British to rethink
their relations with their Irish neighbors. And by
1921, the British offer to enter into negotiations
that result in the creation of the Irish Free State.
The treaty which stems from these negotiations, however, though granting the Irish
control of their own government, requires the
Irish to swear allegiance to the British Crown.
More galling, the treaty calls for a partition of
the island, with Northern Ireland remaining, as
it still remains, an integral part of Great Britain.
Divergent responses to this treaty lead directly

to the Irish Civil War, a bloody contest that lasts
until 1923 and finds Collins on one side and his
longtime allies Boland and De Valera on the
other.
Jordan develops moments of memorable
power in Michael Collins. The emotional
response to Collins' speech in which he demands
of the crowd, should he be arrested or killed,
"Which one of you will take my place?" recalls
that moment in Stanley Kubrick's Spartacus
when hundreds of slaves display their willingness to die for their cause by rising in defiance
and declaring one after another, "I am
Spartacus." Michael Collins is also lushly
photographed by the gifted Chris Menges, rich
with period detail supervised by Anthony Pratt
and well acted by all involved.
But Jordan's story just doesn't work, either
as clear narrative or as a vehicle to explore the
repeated connection between violence and independence. In part, the film fails because Jordan
so obviously structured his story around conventional Hollywood formulas. In that regard, he
introduces Julia Roberts as Kitty Kiernan, a
corner in a love triangle with Boland and
Collins. Jordan never manages to integrate this
tepid love story into his main narrative, and near
the picture's climax, he contrives Kitty's
ultimate preference for Collins as the re'ason for
Boland's siding with De Valera. Such a typical
Hollywood convention is beneath this picture's
loftier ambitions.
Elsewhere, Jordan tries to build suspense
out of a long passage where Collins gains
entrance to a secured British document
depository. But the sequence feels artificial from
beginning to end because the director fails ever
to clarify what Collins is looking for that he
doesn't already know. In addition, the director
makes a considerable misstep by failing to
establish the extent of British contempt for,
degradation of and brutality toward the Irish
people. Irish viewers may not need such
historical background, but moviegoers less
familiar with Irish history will. Instead of
capturing a systemic discrimination, Jordan
strives to inflame in a passage where a British
tank smashes into a football
stadium and begins, unprovoked, to fire indiscriminately at players and fans. Whatever actual
event this scene is based on (if any), its crude

rendering makes it feel false and hysterical.
Still, the film's biggest narrative failure
arises from Jordan's construction of his two
central figures. In the film's second big plot turn,
Collins and De Valera seem to swap politics and
personalities. Heretofore, Collins has been the
soldier and the advocate of unrestrained ruthlessness; now he becomes a statesman and a
proponent of compromise. In the film's first
two-thirds, De Valera has been the politician, the
unstinting advocate of political approaches to
the achievement of independence; now he
becomes the unreconstructed revolutionary and
a complicit assassin. De Valera's motivations
might have been largely those of jealousy,
though the film fails to make that case conclusively. Jordan would argue that Collins was
always a reluctant warrior, but he fails to make
that case adequately either. In the end, we don't
know why the two central figures behave as they
do, and as a result we are surprisingly unaffected
by the film's conclusion.
Easily the most troublesome aspect of
Michael Collins, though, is its central political
theme. In this regard Jordan has set up a tough
challenge for himself. He wants us to admire
Michael Collins, reluctantly to accept the
necessity of Collins' violent tactics and ultimately, by emphasizing Collins' support for the
1921 treaty, to distinguish Collins from contemporary Irish terrorists who are trying to eject the
British from Northern Ireland under the flag of
the I.R.A. Certainly Jordan's task is difficult;
perhaps it is impossible. Whichever, he never
comes close to achieving his ends.
I am deeply concerned about the
filmmaker's failure to provide a balanced
historical framework. First of all, Jordan fails to
acknowledge, even in passing, the role of
religion in the centuries-long history of violence
and repression in Ireland. Even when the film
turns its attention to the treaty of 1921 and the
partition which Collins advocates as a necessary
compromise, Jordan provides no explanation
that the boundaries of the Irish Free State were
designed to include all Catholic-majority
counties and that Northern Ireland was
excluded because of its Protestant majority,
which expressly desired to continue its established relationship with Great Britain. In this
regard it is probably important to understand

that Northern Ireland does not even include all
the counties of Ulster. Majority Catholic
counties in Ulster, as elsewhere, were assigned to
the Free State.
I do not intend the establishment of these
concerns to translate into a pro-British reading
of Michael Collins. British prejudice toward the
Irish had by no means ended by the 1910s. And
it's not hard to understand Irish hostility to an
armed British presence on their soil, particularly
given the long and troubled nature of IrishBritish relations. In one manner or another,
Ireland had been under British rule since the
reign of Henry II in the middle of the twelfth
century. Conscious efforts to settle Englishmen
on Irish estates began in the sixteenth century
and led to a time of particularly brutal repression
during the reign of Elizabeth I. Under Oliver
Cromwell in the middle of the seventeenth
century, nearly two-thirds of the land in Ireland
passed into the hands of Protestants, reducing
the status of the Catholic majority to that of
serfdom. Then, in the 18th century, the British
parliament adopted viciously restrictive trade
laws that nearly destroyed the Irish economy.
Cause for Irish resentment toward the British, in
other words, was real and longstanding.
Still, beginning in the nineteenth century,
significant steps were taken by the British
Parliament toward extending to the Irish people
participation in the British democracy. William
Pitt, the Younger, secured passage of the Act of
Union which effectively incorporated Ireland
into Great Britain. Thereafter, until the treaty of
1921, Ireland was included, as Scotland and
Northern Ireland are today, as a constituent part
of the British nation. In 1829, parliament passed
legislation assuring full British citizenship to
Roman Catholics, including the right to vote and
hold office. And by 1918, at the time Michael
Collins got out of jail for his participation in the
Easter Rising, Irish voters sent 106 members to
the British Parliament.
But Michael Collins makes no mention of
any efforts the British made to end discrimination and enter into a partnership with the Irish
people, Catholic as well as Protestant. Instead
the movie makes it seem there were no available,
peaceful, democratic avenues for pursuing Irish
concerns, even for pursuing mechanisms for
achieving complete Irish independence. Jordan
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makes much of a scene in which Collins, not
long after launching his terrorist campaign,
declares his hatred for the British, explaining, "I
hate them for leaving us no other way out."
History, on the other hand, would suggest that
there were other ways out. William Gladstone
introduced Irish home rule legislation as early as
the 1880s. It's not hard to extrapolate from that
fact that Irish independence just might have been
achieved by some means other than shooting
down unarmed people in the street.
If we took a strictly historical approach to
Michael Collins we would find other questions
to ask. Why, for instance, did the filmmaker fail
to make a character of Sinn Fein leader Arthur
Griffith? It was Griffith, not Collins, who served
as lead negotiator of the 1921 treaty. Jordan
makes Collins the martyr of the treaty, when his
historical role may have been little more than
one of its many supporters. But Jordan
absolutely deserves the license to build a
dramatic story out of historical materials and
thus the right to tinker with the details in the
service of storytelling. In the end, though, we
have an equal right to question his purposes in
straying from historical accuracy. Here it would
seem that his purpose is to enhance one's view of
Michael Collins as a hero. The Michael Collins
we meet in this movie may eventually become an
advocate of compromise and in that manner a
man of peace, but it is essential to remember that
he never for a second questions his earlier
violent tactics, never for a second wonders
whether his ends might have been achievable
without bloodshed.
Neil Jordan has protested vehemently that
Michael Collins is not intended to be an apology
for the I.R.A. And I believe he speaks the truth
about his own motivations. For whatever
reasons, Collins is his hero, and Collins breaks
with the I.R.A. to support policies of
compromise and gradualism. But by failing to
entertain the possibility that some version of the
1921 treaty could have been achieved without
terrorist violence Jordan's movie may serve to
excuse in the past what the director himself
opposes in the present. In
sum,
Michael
Collins just isn't very well thought out.
the nature of man

The weaknesses of Michael Collins are high-

lighted by thinking about the movie in contrast
with Jordan's 1992 film The Crying Game,
which also deals with the I.R.A. When he's
working at the top of his considerable powers,
Jordan doesn't waste a single detail, from his
opening with Percy Sledge singing "When a Man
Loves a Woman" to the ironic end with Lyle
Lovett singing "Stand By Your Man." In the
picture's initial passage, a black man named J ody
(Forest Whitaker) is attending a contemporary
Northern Ireland fair. Trying to capture the
affections of a flirtatious blonde, Jody is playing
a game of ring toss, hoping to win a stuffed toy.
The game requires an element of skill, but an
element of luck too. And nothing's what it
seems. Jody's seeming good luck is his enduring
misfortune. He's a soldier in Britain's controversial army of occupation. The blonde is an
operative in the Irish Republican Army. The
prize Jody wins isn't a lure to help him catch the
lady, but bait in a trap for which he's the quarry.
Chief among the picture's strengths is
its dense and surprising plot. (I am assuming that
my readers are aware of the crucial moment in
the film's narrative which caused so much whispering at the time of the picture's release, but I
shall try to protect that passage for those who

have yet to see it.) The I.R.A. blonde is a woman
named Jude (Miranda Richardson). She lures
Jody into an ambush. He's overpowered, bound
and held hostage. The I.R.A. is hoping to
exchange Jody for one of its own members who
has been arrested by the British. During his
incarceration, Jody manages to make a human
connection with Fergus (Stephen Rea), the man
assigned to guard him. Fergus is a believer in the
I.R.A.'s goal of driving the British from his
homeland. But it's evident he's losing his
enthusiasm for the terrorist tactics by which the
I.R.A. pursues its objectives. Fergus wants to let
Jody know he bears the Brit no personal animus.
Fergus treats Jody as kindly as possible given the
circumstances; he feeds Jody, frees Jody from
wearing a suffocating hood, talks with Jody
about their shared passion for cricket and listens
to Jody's longing for his hairdresser girlfriend,
Dil Uaye Davidson). In a scene which will
resonate throughout the rest of the film, Fergus
helps J ody relieve himself, even though this
requires Fergus distastefully to hold Jody's penis
so that the handcuffed prisoner can urinate
without wetting himself.
Despite their connection, Jody is eventually killed, and Fergus is traumatized by his

Eamon De Valera (Alan Rickman), Michael Collins (Liam Neeson) and Harry Boland (Aidan Quinn) in Geffen
Pictures' film Michael Collins.
Photo Copyright 1996 Geffen Pictures.

role in his prisoner's death. Mterwards, Fergus
disappears from the I.R.A. and starts life anew as
a construction worker in London. Mter a time,
he shows up at Oil's salon, lets her cut his hair
and gradually allows himself to drift into a relationship with her. His motives are unclear, even
to himself. In part, he wants to atone for his guilt
over Jody, a guilt, we should note that we never
discover in Michael Collins; in part, Fergus is
lonely and likes the fact that Oil responds to him.
In the end, when the I.R.A. tries to draw Fergus
back to its service, he clings to a chosen responsibility for Oil. Thus he does what he can to
protect her, even at his own peril.
The Crying Game is not primarily
concerned with the turmoil in Northern Ireland.
But at least in passing it addresses what's
happening there. Though they have volunteered
for their duty, Fergus and Jody are nonetheless
pawns of ideologies which elude their understanding and trample on their personal interests.
Both may be criticized for "joining up," but once
they've become soldiers, they're expected to
shelve their own human instincts. They become
critically connected because neither is willing
nor perhaps fundamentally capable of doing so.
In the final analysis, The Crying Game is
concerned with the unrest and violence in
Northern Ireland only as a metaphor for a more
pervasive division in the global community of
human beings. In this regard we must focus on a
story J ody tells Fergus as they await a decision
about Jody's fate. A scorpion who cannot swim
asks a frog for a ride across a river on the frog's
back. "What's to keep you from stinging me if I
let you up on my back?" the leery frog inquires.
"If I should sting you," the scorpion rejoins,
"then we both would drown." Consoled by that
logic, the frog agrees to the scorpion's request.
But in the middle of the river, the scorpion stings
the frog despite his promise not to. As the frog is
dying, he asks why the scorpion has committed
an act that will lead to both their deaths.
"Because it's in my nature," the scorpion replies.
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The question Neil Jordan thus poses in The
Crying Game becomes, "What is the nature of
man?" Evidence in Northern Ireland suggests
that man's nature is that of the scorpion. Men
who belong to different clans or different
religions will hate and kill each other even at the
expense of their own well being. Elsewhere, men
who belong to different races or ethnic groups,
men who possess different sexual orientations,
will brutalize each other for reasons owing to
their differences alone. But some men,
anyway, men named Mohandas Gandhi and
Albert Schweitzer and Martin Luther King Jr.,
suggest that human nature includes the nonscorpion-like qualities of compassion and selfsacrifice. In making his own self-sacrifice, Fergus
aligns himself with those who reject violent
solutions; he repudiates and seeks to atone for
the violence of his own past. Michael Collins, in
contrast, tries to have it both ways, tries to
embrace compromise and peace while clinging
to the efficacy of his own violent actions.
Fergus is a member of the I.R.A. that
Michael Collins founded. We are not told
Fergus's history, but we know he is a volunteer
member of an organization that has targeted the
innocent in the pursuit of its political objectives.
Jody says forthrightly that it's in Fergus's nature
to kill. Such is Fergus's struggle to redeem
himself, to free himself from Jody's pointed
condemnation. But how far is he willing to go?
How much can he change himself? The change
that is required of him is one that most viewers
will find astonishing and some may even deem
repellent. But that's Jordan's exact point.
Redemption is not easy.
The change required of Fergus, however, is
best understood in metaphoric terms. Fergus learns
to view the world in a different way. He becomes
tolerant in a way heretofore inconceivable. And
this is exactly what is required. To be redeemed
Fergus must change his nature. But that's exactly
what Michael Collins does not do. He changes his
tactics, but his nature remains the same.
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Tom Willadsen

Though I'm too late to get in on it now, I
did notice that the last isue of The Cresset was
focused on struggle. What would I have written
then? Maybe the process of finding my job here
in suburban Baltimore, some tidbits in my
struggle to climb Jacob's, I mean the ecclesiastical, ladder.
Had I decided that my search for my
current gig was "my struggle," I could have
included a long section contrasting the different
approaches of the. two churches that actually
paid for me to fly across the country and preach
in neutral pulpits. (Presbyterians are very afraid
of giving any candidate for a job "home pulpit
advantage.") I envisioned a column similar to
the Goofus and Gallant cartoon that I used to
read in Highlights magazine in Dr. Cohen's
office:
-The Goofus church did not send their
information to Tom in a timely manner and had
to fax it to the office of one his parishioners.
-The Gallant church mailed everything
promptly.
-The Goofus church only reimbursed
Tom for his interview expenses after their
Presbytery's Committee on Ministry intervened,
three months after the interview.
-The Gallant church paid for both Tom
and Mary to visit them. They even reimbursed
them for the expensive sea food supper they
ordered by mistake.
After no struggle whatsoever I picked ( by
that I mean, "I felt the Holy Spirit calling me
to") the Gallant church. It was a good choice,;
they laugh at the jokes I tell in my sermons and
the Orioles give clergy a free pass to their home
games.
Well, then there's all the problems I had

with my Student Loans and how a couple times
they capitalized interest incorrectly and how I
couldn't get my seminary to tell the Student
Loan Nazis that I really was a full-time student
certain quarters and how for six years I've been
faithfully making my monthly payments and so
in a few days (really, 29 days now) I will own my
bachelor's degree. They won't be able to come
to my house and repossess my education.
So I don't look very good for an issue on
struggle. Life had been so easy for me that I was
down to writing a "meta-column" about my
struggle to write about struggle without having
struggled.
Then we started to look at houses.
Realtors love the idea of helping a new
minister and his pretty wife and their baby boy
find a good starter house. Later they realize that
ministers do not make much money.
Our realtor took us to see nine rowhouses
or townhomes one Monday morning.
Townhomes are the starter house in Baltimore
County. If you are starting with a little more
money, you can look at EOG's, end of group
units. EOG's are a little bigger and have
windows on three sides. We were stuck looking
at 20' x 30' -three-story-with-an-attic places
with windows in front and back, and another
rowhouse on each side. Some are really only 18'
x 28'. Some have entrances on the first floor,
others on the second. Some have walk-out
basements; others have spooky, narrow
stairways up to the back yard. Some have
appliances. Some have modern kitchens. All
have pink bathrooms-it's the law in Baltimore
County.
After seeing three of these we started to
forget the details of each house we'd seen.

Tom Willadsen
and his family
recently moved
from Gelding Drive
in Cockeysville,
Maryland,
to blush-evoking
address
tn

Baltimore.
In "Letters from
the Front"
he writes
for The Cresset
on clergy and
parish life.

·~e you talking about the one on Pleasant
Plain?" Mary would ask.
"No, I mean the one that had the trash
compactor."
"The one with the dining room window
that wouldn't stay open?"
"You remember, that one where I found
the nickel in the cupboard, it needs more insulation."
After a week of this kind of conversation
we narrowed our search to three: the one with
the old lady; the one next door to her, which had
a sandbox and tire swing; and one with a lot of
new kitchen gadgets.
We went back for another look. The old
lady was still there; her place was spotless. She
cooed at Peter, she goes to a Presbyterian church,
"surely she was going to drop her price a couple
grand for a nice family like us," I thought.
At house number two the sandbox was in
good shape, but there were some ants in the
kitchen this time and we didn't like the kitchen
tile much.
House number three had signs that it had
gotten some water in after one of the hurricanespawned rain storms the week before.
We pounced on the old lady's house. Too
late, she'd just sold hers to a nurse. We pounced
on house number two. Except no one pounces
on a house in Maryland. We had to make an
offer and sign it. We had to have a professional
come in and inspect it for structural soundness.
We had to meet with a banker who had to have
proof that we could afford to buy a starter
house. The banker had "to start the ball rolling"
so we could qualify for a terrific first time home
buyer deal in Maryland. All this time the folks
who were selling the house were in Guam, we
think.
Balls roll slowly when you're buying a
house. We had to sign and initial forms saying that
we understood that there may be lead paint, radon
gas and unwashed garden tools in the house. We
had to sign forms that showed that our realtor had
explained that the house is not currently in a flood
plain and is therefore exempt from something,
maybe flooding, she talked pretty fast. We had to
initial forms that showed that we had signed other
forms. This must be how Colonel Blake felt when
Radar used to approach him with a clip board, I
thought.
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We set a closing date for a week before
Mary's mother would arrive for a ten day stay.
Then nothing happened. For a long time. No
problem, we could just rent the place until all the
papers were in order. More nothing happened.
Nothing makes us nervous. We knew balls
were rolling, but with Cal Ripken shipped off to
third for a couple games, we just didn't know
where they might be rolling. We checked with
our realtor, ·~e you sure that we can just rent
the joint till all our ducks have their i's dotted
and t' s crossed in a row?"
"I'll confirm that if you want me to," she
assured us.
Then she found out that the relocation
company who was selling this house while its
legal owners were in Guam did not permit that
their houses be rented. We were scared. We
faced the real possibility of being homeless and
right before my mother-in-law was to arrive. I've
tried over the years to make a good impression,
but I really couldn't see how packing everyone
off to a shelter would help raise me in her
esteem.
We begged, whined and cajoled our realtor
and the banker to get those balls rolling a little
faster. Apparently, after Herculean banker and
realtor efforts they were able to fax all the
appropriate documents to the relocation
company, who refused to read and process them.
So the banker and realtor wheedled, importuned
and pestered this company which finally said,
"September 23 to close? No problem."
So first thing in the morning on September
23 we rented a little truck and with volunteer
help from the congregation filled it with our
stuff. In Hebrew there's a word for household
stuff: "recush." My professor used to smile and
say this word really meant "Tupperware." I liked
the image of great caravans of pack animals
crossing miles of wilderness laden with bags full
of Tupperware, though I can't quite picture
Isaiah saying, "Honey, where's the salad
spinner?" I felt a kinship with all those in Biblical
times who had to move.
We drove our heavily-laden truck to the
closing. I felt like Jed Clampett. Then we met
two lawyers, another realtor, a representative
from the relocation company, our realtor and
Hercules, the banker. We made small talk, cooed
at our baby and waited for the documents to

arrive-Beltway traffic was bad. Again, I
pictured Jacob waiting for word from his longlost son, "Dad, it's all right, I heard a semi jackknifed near Cold Spring, he's probably just stuck
in traffic, relax."
The documents arrived and we had to sign
our name 3 7 times. Then we had to hand over a
certified check for our down payment. There was
nothing to it, really. One of those 3 7 signatures
was on-1 swear this is true-a blank sheet of
paper. Just in case someone forgot something,
they could fill it in later. I'm pretty sure we
signed a confession to placing that bomb at the
Olympics; we may have initialed a report on the
probable whereabouts of Jimmy Hoffa. But at
last we got the key to the front-"No, I'm sure I
used it on the back just last week," our realtor
said-door. "Maybe it fits all the doors! Go try it
out, and let us know," the relocation company
person said.
Back into the truck for our first of about 20
trips to unload our recush. I started to think of
everything we carried in as recush.
"Tom, what's in that box? Does it say
'dining room'?"
"Recush, hon.lt's all recush."
I think I will always smile when I think of
my Kansas albums as recush.
A few years ago when our seminary class
faced its diaspora, one of my classmates said that
she thinks the worst curse that Adam and Eve got
was that they had to move. Sure, bread by the
sweat of one's brow isn't terrific and no one's in
favor of pain in childbirth-but moving was the
worst possible curse. I think there's a lot of truth
to that.
When we arrived at our new place we were
greeted by our group's busybody, Walter. Walter
keeps on eye on everything and everyone. Walter
is outside most of the time, tinkering with his
downspouts or raking leaves. He spends a lot of
time "plucking up and pulling down ... building
and planting Ueremiah 1:10)." He's raised
puttering to an art form.
Walter saw our full truck and pitched right
in. 'Course, his heart's not too good and his knee
gives out every once in a while, but he's happy to
help. He's in pretty good shape for 83, if you ask
him. We didn't have to.
Mary Jane from our church came to watch
the baby so Mary and I could move big stuff. But

Peter didn't want anyone but Mom. So Mary
Jane helped carry things, she also brought us
some supper, which we'd forgotten about
entirely.
The next day another woman from church,
Ginny, came over and loaded at the old place
and unloaded at the new one. She ran home to
get a hammer so we could get the door off its
hinges. She brought us big sandwiches from the
deli and iced oatmeal cookies. She'd just gone
through a move the summer before and knew
that we could use more hands.
Last week I was thumbing through the
hymnal, during an otherwise dull service and
decided to see what the index had for "moving."
The closest I came was one reference to
"mourning," under which was "By the
Babylonian Rivers":
"How shall we sing the Lord's song,
In a strange and bitter land?"
All I could do was laugh. In a way, moving
feels like exile. Right now it feels like our whole
universe has pivoted about five miles southeast.
But we're getting used to it. We know our other
neighbors' names now. We've planted some
bulbs and put up baby gates. We know which
store sells the good iced oatmeal cookies. And
we keep finding new things. At least these things
feel new because they've been hidden in boxes
for months now. It feels a little like Christmas
would for someone with faulty memory.
About the only surprise in the whole thing
(besides the damn mouse, which is, as they say,
"a whole 'nother story") is that we live in this
great new place-with all our old crappy stuff.
For some reason I imagined that our new place
would house new stuff. But we're still sitting on
the wicker love seat with the little nail that sticks
up and snags your sweater and our cassette
player is still broken. I always pictured that
everything about our new home would be
entirely new, and it is, in a word, not.
Still, I think we're better off than Adam
and Eve were when they moved. I mean, did
they have an enthusiastic, though frail, 83 year
old help them schlep their recush into their new
digs east of Eden? Did they have nice people
bring them meals when they forgot to eat? From
whom could they borrow a hammer or a hand
truck? I'll even say we're blessed, soon as that
salad spinner turns up.

Steiner, Wendy. The Scandal of Pleasure.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995.
Imagine an exhibition, entitled
"never again," featuring an artist's
collection of black and white
photographs of partial-birth abortions.
How would the public respond? Much
would depend, I suppose, on some key
to the artist's intentions, for the meaning
of the exhibition is not sufficiently transparent from title and subject matter
alone. "Never again" might, to the prochoice audience, echo the pro-choice
rhetoric of never returning to the days of
back alley butchers and might, thus,
indicate the artist's affirmation of free
and easy access to abortions. Or "never
again" might, to the pro-life audience,
signal the response to the Holocaust and
indicate the artist's identification of
American attitudes to abortion as
morally equivalent to the attitudes of
German citizens towards the genocide of
Jews. Without contextual information
neither pro-life nor pro-choice forces
would know how to respond to the exhibition (though I suspect photographs of
partial birth abortions would suffice to
convince all but the most ideologically
pure that partial birth abortions are
morally problematic).
Imagine that in interviews the
artist has expressed her opposition to
"the horrible, ugly truth" of partial birth
abortions. Even those who disagreed
with them would not, I think, believe
pro-choice forces to be unwarranted in
boycotting the gallery, for this public
exhibition is an affront to their values.
Free, easy access to abortion is so great a
good to them that any threat to that
good demands their response. Indeed, a
response to "never again" which was
neither outrage nor affirmation might be
trouble us, so provocative is the subject
of the artist.
Yet I take it that something exactly
like this, some response that would be
neither outrage nor affirmation, is what
Wendy Steiner, professor of English at
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the University of Pennsylvania calls for in
her beautifully produced The Scandal of
Pleasure. She describes her book as
...an argument for the subjectivity
of aesthetic response, an attempt to
explain what it means to invest art
with value and derive pleasure
from it. It tries to demonstrate the
utility of a liberal aesthetics in
which art is neither identical to
reality, nor isolated from it, but a
virtual realm tied to the world by
acts of interpretation. (8)
Both we and our world will be sweeter
and more tolerant when we learn to read
artworks as liberals, she argues, recognizing the variety of meanings available
in a work of art. She writes to champion
freedom of speech and thought, to
propagate the liberal faith, a faith which,
by her lights, preclude~ the possibility of
uniform meaning in an art~ork a~d,
thus, non-ambivalent responses to
artworks.
She develops her case for a liberal
aesthetics in five chapters, each of them
examining some recent controversy in
the world of the arts, each exhibiting a
misreading--either fundamentalist or
leftist--by those who are scandalized by
the genuine nature of artworks. In
chapter one she discusses the
photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe
and the controversies they have created.
From here she turns to the attack upon
pornography by radicals like Andrea
Dworkin. Chapter three focuses on
Salman Rushdie and the fatwa
pronounced upon him. Chapter four
addresses the attack upon the academy
by political conservatives and the final
chapter discusses Anthony Blunt, Martin
Heidegger, and Paul DeMan, each of
whom betrayed the academy by his
political affiliations.
Steiner's claim is that in every case
mistakes are made, controversies
created, because the art audience will not
permit art to be and do what it is meant
to do. The purpose of art is aesthetic
pleasure; misreadings occur when
viewers, absent a liberal aesthetic,

respond to art as though it is reality,
rather than virtual reality. Liberal
aesthetes, by contrast, recognize that art
is paradoxical and that the pleasure and
value of art arises from its paradoxical
character.
The aesthetic paradox is that art is
virtual reality. Art refers to reality and
resembles reality without being reality
itself. Artworks exist as entities in and of
themselves but also as entities making
reference to the real world. Thus,
... art's power comes from its contradictoriness. It both is and is not a part of
reality; it both acts on and is irrelevant to
politics and history. Irritating as such
contradictions are, unless we maintain
both sides of them we end up with a
grotesque view of both art and life. (117)
The pleasure of art lies in the recognition
that the "art-reality" we experience
effects the real world, evokes real
responses in us, even though it is itself
only virtual reality. The pleasure of art
lies in the recognition that this virtual
reality, because it is virtual, has many
meanings and the good spectator, aware
of this, enters the work and adapts it to
her needs and interests and is, thus,
better able to engage reality itself.
Aesthetic judgments are, Steiner
maintains, ineliminably subjective, every
judgment informed by the interpreter's
interests, every aesthetic judgment a
"personal revelation of preference, of
pleasure." This, she suggests, is
recognized by religious conservatives
though their values are, apparently, the
wrong set of values.
What Steiner displays for the
reader, thus, are numerous examples of
alleged misreadings of works of art. With
respect to Mapplethorpe, she finds the
claim of art critics that the photographs
are merely about form as preposterous as
the interpretation of the photographs as
real-world speech advocating sexual
practices. Andrea Dworkin and
Catherine MacKinnon make similar
mistakes, confusing the virtual reality of
pornography with reality itself, the same

mistake made by Islamic fundamentalists
in reading Salman Rushdie. In each case,
however, there is help available. There
are art experts like Steiner who
understand art and the plurality of
meanings in each artwork, critics
"licensed to do so not only because they
are knowledgeable technicians but
because their personal take on the world
and on art is deemed useful by those who
are not critics." Leaving the liberal
critics, in our culture housed in the
academy, to guide our interpretations of
the variety of meanings of artworks is to
secure a pleasurable aesthetic future for
ourselves.
If Steiner's liberal aesthetic theory
is true, it is true only of some artworks.
What Steiner is addressing is high art,
not the art that decorates and brings
delight in everyday life. Neither the
sweater that I wear nor the chair in
which I sit as I write nor the garden
outside my window are as indeterminate
in meaning as Steiner takes artworks to
be. The same is true of religious art, the
success of which depends upon its having
a fairly clear meaning. But even if we
think of Steiner as speaking only of the
high arts, arts the intention of which is to
be the recipient of disinterested contemplation, problems remain. It is not at all
clear how music is virtual reality, what
reality music may be said to resemble.
And so it is with abstract painting and
sculpture.
In fact, Steiner's discussion
attends only to photographs and to
fiction and those arts which are most
plausibly interpreted as virtual reality.
What if we read Steiner's theory as a
theory about only these arts? I'm not
sure it fares much better. To maintain
that art is ineliminably subjective is not
to say that it is exclusively subjective and
it must be the former rather than the
latter claim that Steiner wishes to make,
her apparent comments to the contrary
notwithstanding. The role of the critic
makes this clear. Were our assessments of
artworks completely subjective there
would be little need for either literature
professors or art critics. There would be
little more to be said than that how one
responds to an artwork is how one
responds, though no doubt sociologists
might find it rewarding to make generalizations about how groups of individuals
respond. It must be that art critics and
literature professors, however much

Siskel and Ebert may have convinced us
to think otherwise, actually do see
something more about artworks than the
untutored audience. To reduce the work
of the critic to shoring up the reader in
the readings of a work that satisfy the
reader's needs and interests is to
transform the critic into a therapist and
to trivialize art. Artworks are not
necessary tools for the therapeutic work
upon fractured egos.
Steiner's claim is that the critic
knows that artworks have a variety of
meanings; the function of the critic,
then, is to point to characteristics of
artworks that support more than one
reading of the artwork. It is unclear just
how subjectivist Steiner wishes to be at
this point, whether no readings of a text
are better than any other readings. Her
claim is, at any rate, that the reader,
aware of the work's multiple meanings,
will embrace the meaning that suits her
interests and find pleasure having done
so. Perhaps.
Perhaps not. Why Steiner or
anyone else thinks that what is most
important about an artwork is its
meaning is puzzling to me. Indeed, why
would anyone think that all artworks
have meaning other than and in addition
to something like "this object is worthy
of being attended to"? I consider myself
an advocate of meaning, but if by
"meaning" one means something like
"claims to truth about the way things
are" then I would sooner direct students
to philosophy than to art, for it isn't clear
to me that art is, or should be, in the
meaning business. And if that is not what
one means by "meaning", what is meant?
Furthermore, if the meaning of artworks
lies merely in their non-discursive
advocacy of a lot of beliefs, some of which
may be incompatible, artworks will be
important merely as pre-philosophy, as an
effective way to acquire new beliefs
without argument. In short, I find
Steiner's claims about that wherein the
value of art lies to be ultimately demeaning.
All of this is to say that I don't find
Steiner's argument for a liberal aesthetics
to be persuasive. (Nor do I find it to be
especially liberal, though that is another
story.) That we can resolve political
conflicts-which I take to be the
character of the Mapplethorpe,
Dworkin, and Rushdie conflicts-by
means of better aesthetic theory is a

claim almost worthy of ridicule. Andrea
Dworkin, to my mind, really doesn't care
about whether pornography has one or
more meanings. The question of the
multiple
meanings
of
child
pornography-and what might those
multiple meanings be?-was irrelevant
to debates as to whether we were to be
the sort of community which permits
access to kiddie porn. Dworkin contends
that, whatever the meanings of
pornography, it presents a significant
harm to women and thus should be
outlawed. The political question is
whether that significant harm claimed by
Dworkin can be established and, if so,
whether the harm is great enough to
warrant a restriction of liberties.
Likewise with Rushdie. The question
isn't whether the imam's reading of
Rushdie is adequate, the question is what
do we do with a western citizen whose
literary work is so predictably offensive
to a powerful political community. There
are important issues here of civility and
how the romanticization of the artist in
the contemporary west has left the artist
feeling exempt from the demands of
civility. These are not issues that would
dissolve upon the recognition that a
work has multiple meanings.
The Scandal of Pleasure is worth a
read. Steiner's discussions of some
recent conflicts are informative and
provocative. If one takes "post-modern
liberalism"-if there can be such a
thing-as a viable position, then
Steiner's presentation is as persuasive as
any of which I am aware. But that is only
to say, not very.
Thomas D. Kennedy

Hartle, Ann. Self-Knowledge in the Age
of Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1996.
"Know thyself," was the message of the
Oracle at Delphi. The Delphic Oracle
was also supposed to have said that no
living person was wiser than Socrateswhich Socrates took to mean that he was
wisest because he realized his own
ignorance. And even centuries after
Socrates, when philosophy has become
an academic discipline, it remains also a
"way," a quest for self-knowledge, and
one suspects that at least some under-

graduates are drawn to it precisely for
such reasons. If so, and if they are in the
mood for a serious book, Ann Hartle has
written one.
"The aim of this book," she
writes, "is to defend the claim that
philosophy is the search for selfknowledge and that the search for selfknowledge must ultimately be or become
philosophical." Indeed, for Hartle the
only self-knowledge life seems to offer is
the endless striving for insight that
extended conversation with the philosophical tradition provides. I myself
doubt whether that claim is persuasivewhether, that is, it really answers the
needs of our human condition.
Nevertheless, Hartle has written a
profound book that will repay careful
study. Particularly for those who have
been influenced by the turn in recent
years to concepts of "narrative" and
"story," her book is an important philosophical exploration.
Before developing her vision of
philosophy as the search for selfknowledge, Hartle devotes three
chapters to an examination of other
approaches. The structure of her
argument has been deeply influenced by
Stephen Crites' justly famous article on
"The Narrative Quality of Experience."
Hence, she discusses theory (Crites'
"abstraction" from the flow of experience) and anti-theory (Crites'
"contraction" to isolated moments of
experience) and narrative (Crites' own
suggestion, following Augustine, of how
the unity of a self is captured in a timefull story that both recognizes the meaningfulness of concrete moments and the
need for unity over time in one's sense of
self).
Many significant contemporary
philosophers (Hartle has Quine in
particular in mind) see theoryconstruction as the heart of philosophy.
Just as the sciences develop theories
about one or another part of the natural
world, so philosophy seeks to develop a
theory of theories-a theory about what
constitutes a good theory. In order to do
this, the philosopher does not directly
engage life but abstracts from it. Thus,
for example, the concept of natural
selection in the theory of evolution,
although it may seem at first to have its
roots in ordinary experience, is in fact an
abstraction from experience. Within the
theory of evolution it is a technical term.
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We see this if we note, for instance, that
the word 'selection' no longer carries
within the theory any sense of purposiveness, any sense of choosing from
among alternatives. 'Selection' becomes
a metaphor that has meaning only within
the confines of the theory itself.
Whatever the usefulness of
theory-construction in philosophy, it
cannot, Hartle argues, bring us to selfknowledge. For the point of theory is to
abstract from the particularity of actual
experience. Hence, however helpful in
other respects, the way of theory-of
abstraction-cannot be adequate to our
experience of ourselves as agents in the
world. It cannot help us to know
ourselves as we really are.
A thinker such as Stanley Fish
serves as Hartle's paradigmatic antitheorist. Within a theory, terms (such as
' natural selection' above) can have a
precise meaning because they have those
meanings only within the confines of the
theory. For anti-theory, however, terms
have no precise meanings because there
are no theoretical constraints on
meaning. The anti-theorist contracts all
experience to the particular angle of a
single self. That experience must stand
on its own; it cannot be given its
meaning or significance within any
larger context. Hence, there can be no
philosophical
"foundations"
for
knowledge. Any such foundation, any
starting point from which understanding
is derived, would be a constraint on the
self. And, indeed, a desire to cling to such
foundations is taken as a sign of inauthenticity. Hartle's discussion here is
very provocative, for it suggests that
antifoundationalism as an epistemological position is, in fact, grounded in
the will to know no limits to what the self
may be. Thus, for example, in Richard
Rorty's
version
of anti-theory,
confrontation and constraint-the sense
that arguments that seek to make contact
with reality must be given-is replaced
by conversation. But in fact, Hartle
writes, "Conversation is reduced to
chatter." It is the chatter of selves in the
business of positing themselves. All such
conversation becomes political, for each
self is simply a center of desire and
power,
pressing
its
interests.
Conversation never seeks to supply the
kind of reasons that force us up against
the constraints of reality; instead,
conversation becomes simply a way of

seeking common ground with those
whose interests are similar.
On such a view there can, of
course, be no continuity of the self; for
that very continuity would itself be a
constraint on what one might be or
become. The self is radically particular so
that, in fact, it can be anything and
everything in any new moment. As
theory gives universality without
personal significance (abstraction), so
anti-theory givens meaningless particularity (contraction). Or, to borrow a
metaphor from C.S. Lewis, in the
abstraction of theory we know but do
not taste our experience; in the
contraction of anti-theory we taste but
do not know the self. Neither can be an
adequate avenue to knowledge of one's
self.
Where then shall we turn in search
of self-knowledge? Hartle's third
chapter is a probing examination of the
claim that experience is inherently
narrative-a view developed by Crites
and explored by thinkers such as
Ricoeur. The story of a life captures both
its concrete particularity (that is lost in
the abstraction of theory) and its unity
over time (that is lost in the contraction
of anti-theory). As a mode of selfknowledge, therefore, it is for Hartle
vastly superior to the ways of theory and
anti-theory. "Story" does some justice to
the search for meaning in the lives of
persons who, as finite beings, exist in
time, but who, as self-transcending
beings, can also, to some extent, detach
and abstract themselves from timehovering above the moments of experience, so to speak. Augustine's
Confessions is the preeminent example
of such a search for self within the story
of a life. Indeed, in all of Hartle's books
to date Augustine is a hovering presence,
haunting her. She is, in a sense, trying to
exorcise that presence (in this book by
announcing a turn to Montaigne), and
one can only hope that she will not
succeed.
Why does Hartle believe that the
kind of narrative Augustine provides
cannot be sufficient as a means to selfknowledge? In part, she suggests, it is
because narrative must finally display the
being of the self in deeds. It remains a
mode of "exteriority" and cannot reach
true interiority. More important still,
"[t]he truly complete story would
require a divine perspective." That is,

HOME PLACE
Snow pushes against the cottonwoods,
the fences in the calf pasture, and sinks
in the hollows beneath the row of evergreens
where the cottontails hide. Beyond the grove
snow swirls across Highway 14.
Grateful traffic trails a plow.
In my old room under the eaves we lie
in flannel sheets and plaid blankets,
beneath a chenille spread. Downstairs
my father stretches in his recliner,
mother sleeps in her chair, a magazine
angled in her hands.
Tomorrow we fly to our home one range
from the Pacific. But tonight we sleep warm
upstairs in a bed too short for me,
where on other winter nights my mother
rolled my brother and me in blankets,
then covered us with quilts.
Nights I tried to pray in bed,
my thoughts flying to baseball,
catches I would make sliding
across the grass under the lights
holding aloft my gloved hand to show
the glowing ball.

Vincent Wixson

narrative treats a life teleologically-the
end is always in the future. But then one
cannot fully come to know oneself in the
present. The ultimate goal of selfknowledge is never achieved and
enjoyed. "It is only the storyteller who
sees the whole action, and the storyteller's perspective in time, after the
action is completed.
The actors
themselves do not know what they are
doing. Self-disclosure is not self-The
actors themselves do not know what
they are doing. Self-disclosure is not selfknowledge" Hence, the story of one's
life displays what it cannot itself account
for, and it does not give full selfknowledge.
We should note in passing-as
Hartle, of course, fully recognizes-that
Augustine himself wold not have
disagreed. The story told in the
Confessions is a story that begins in the
search for self-knowledge and ends in
the recognition that God knows him
better than he can know himself. "Let me
know you, my knower," Augustine
prays. In other words, Augustine does
not disagree with Hartle's contention
that narrative cannot provide full selfknowledge. But instead of turning to
philosophy in search of such knowledge,
Augustine puts aside the search. He does
not say, as Montaigne does, "I am myself
the substance of my book." Rather,
handing himself over to the God who
knows him better than he knows himself,
Augustine is freed from such attention to
himself. He has found a better Object for
his love and praise.
Not so Hartle, however. For her,
" [t]he form of particularity that is
relevant for self-knowledge is interiority,
and interiority is coincident with
philosophy and is ultimately the philosophical mode of being." The "human
condition" is such that we are caught
between the angels and the beasts,
between God and nothingness. We are,
that is, strangely two-sided and
ambivalent creatures-belonging in a
place, yet inevitably discontented with
that place because we sense that we are
made for something more. Anxious and
discontented, it is the glory of our
condition that we are ignorant of who
we are. We must, therefore, search for
true self-knowledge.
We find it in the history of
philosophy and the philosophical
conversation with friends-friends such
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as Socrates, Augustine, Montaigne, and
Descartes-to which that history invites
us. That is not, Hartle insists, a search for
any divine perspective, the godlike
perspective of the narrator of a story. It is
a search from within the human
condition, a search for human experience as a concrete and meaningful
whole. And it finally gives, of course, a
self-knowledge that is only "the
knowledge of ignorance." It is, in other
words, a never-ending quest-a serious
and integral way of life-that is
determined to know oneself only from
within the limits of our nature. It turns
away resolutely from the external help
Augustine found in that one thing the
Platonists did not know-the Word
made flesh. As such it is a powerful and
moving expression of philosophy not
just as a discipline one studies but as a
way of life. It is also a case for the study
of the history of philosophy as a
liberating discipline. For that reason this
is a book well worth reading and
pondering even if one is, as I am,
inclined to regret that Hartle has taken
her stand with Montaigne in his study
rather than with Augustine in the garden.
Gilbert Meilaender

Samuelson, Norbert. Judaism and the
Doctrine of Creation. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 362
PP·

This book by Norbert Samuelson
represents a contribution to the everwidening circle of texts that attempt to
answer the question, "What do recent
findings in the sciences have to say about
the nature and meaning of religious
beliefs?" The question is a very old one
for the traditions-like the long Jewish
philosophicaVtheological traditions-so
the newness of this attempt is related to
the recent onslaught of findings in
cosmology that have rather dramatically
changed the way that scientists believe
the universe began and developed to its
present state. Even so, Samuelson is not
alone in trying to think about these new
developments, joined by such giants as
Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacock, Phil
Hefner, and John Polkinghorne, to name
a few. Samuelson's efforts are unique in
two ways though. First, there are few

Jewish thinkers among theologians who
have been drawn into this discussion.
Samuelson is clearly an able representative to add a Jewish view to the
perspectives of others mentioned.
Second, Samuelson is determined to set
any thinking about new theological ideas
into the context of the history of Jewish
thought. Not only does this mean that he
gives the reader a splendid review of that
material, but he makes a compelling
argument for saying that the tradition is
at least an equal partner with science in
the search for truth and meaning.
Moving from particular tradition
to science is not the only way that the
relation between science and theology
can be understood or that a dialogue can
be perceived and engaged. Many might
suggest the other way around, claiming
that we need to begin in science in order
to give credibility to religious belief and
thought. Indeed, there are some who
honestly think that even that project is a
lost cause, seeking rather to create a new
religious vision out of the insight of
modern science and rational thought.
There are those who believe that the
religious vision and the scientific
viewpoint are incompatible as such,
speaking to two different subjects and
experiences. Indeed, the notion that we
can work essentially from particular
traditions to form intelligible theologies
is a more recent development in these
discussions not yet receiving a positive
reception from all circles.
Nevertheless, Samuelson presents
a doctrine of creation rooted in the
scripture and in the massive interpretation of key biblical texts by the rabbinic
tradition from the midrash and Talmud
through Jewish philosophy from the
medieval to the modern world. The logic
of a Jewish doctrine remains the flow of
interpretation of the tradition in the
Jewish community of scholars. The point
is that Jews need to be clear about what
the tradition says before that
"particular" tradition confronts the
world of contemporary science.
Therefore, the work of Samuelson, like
the previous volumes from Peacocke and
Hefner, can become an interesting test
case for this way of understanding the
dialogue between theology and science.
Let me be clear about just what
this approach to the dialogue entails. If
we begin by assuming the independent
rationality of the religious/theological

tradition, which' is what Samuelson does
assume, then we begin by asserting that
those ideas have a status in our claims
about what is true about the world we
live in. To say that theologies have their
own legitimate rationality is not a private
but a public claim that means at least that
there must be a fit between a scientific
view of the world and the independent
claims arising from religions. Samuelson
gives plenty of material to show not only
that the tradition has its own rationality
but that the tradition is also filled with
alternative perspectives and an ongoing
interaction between thinkers, assuring
that any view receives considerable
scrutiny and critical challenge.
So how does this rational theological tradition relate to the claims of
modern cosmology?
Samuelson's
argument is that the doctrine of creation,
for example, relates to the developments
of contemporary science by adding those
claims to the many other options that are

included in the theological tradition.
That is, this dialogue works to enrich the
options available while at the same time
placing the possible perspectives of
modern cosmology under the scrutiny of
the criteria of the theological tradition,
that is, of the Jewish community at this
time. The already established criteria for
rationality in the Jewish tradition
become the arbiters. In that way, any
number of perspectives, such as the Big
Bang cosmology with its view of the
expanding universe and the space-time
continuum, can be seen as consonant
with and thus helpful for shaping an
adequate Jewish view of creation.
Samuelson struggles with this issue in the
latter stages of his book realizing as we
all do that science does not pretend to
form a worldview but probably assumes
one anyway merely in the basic
requirements for doing science at all. But
this does not mean, however, that ideas
critical for a full doctrine of creation can

be gleaned from this view by itself. For
Samuelson, a key issue remains resolving
an adequate view of the good from the
apparent lack of any basis for shaping
values from modern cosmology. Indeed,
other past options, like the one from
Timaeus, might be even more adequate
for a Jewish view of the good than is
contemporary cosmology.
Samuelson's effort is not only
intriguing but it is also so well supported
in its historical survey that this book has
to be counted among the more
important contributions to this growing
conversation. Surely the approach will
not satisfy some who see the relation
between science and theology more
tenuous or characterized differently than
Samuelson, but the work done in this
book will be of enormous value to others
looking for a way to take seriously both
new science and received religious
traditions and respect both fully.
James F. Moore
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is the Board of Directors Chair of Christian Ethics at VU. He is the author of Body, Soul and Bioethics
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The Advent Banner
(1994)

focuses
upon the
coming of the
Christ-Child
and on
his mother.
The
traditional
"0 Antiphons,"

recalling scriptural
references to
Messiah,
emanate from the
central
medallion.
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The Epiphany Banner
(1995)

celebrates the
manifestation of
Christ to the
Gentiles.
The symbols
of star and rose
refer to the three
kings, as well
as to Isaiah's
prophecy of the
desert bursting into
bloom at the coming
of the Kingdom of
God.
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